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In recent years, there has been a growing belief that 
the pressing problem of racial bias in policing might be 
ameliorated by a technical fix—namely, police body-worn 
cameras.  Accordingly, body-worn cameras have been intro-
duced in police departments across the country, giving rise to 
a variety of different internal guidelines and policies.  This 
Note surveys the body-worn camera policies of the ten largest 
metropolitan police departments in the United States in order 
to assess their relative effectiveness at combatting racial bias.  
Particular attention is paid to “activation” requirements, 
which specify the sorts of events police officers are required to 
record on their cameras.  The survey shows that, at present, 
many body-worn camera policies are not appropriately cali-
brated to successfully reduce racial bias in policing.  In par-
ticular, this Note suggests that many current body-worn 
camera policies do not adequately target two different strains 
of racial bias: implicit racial bias and deliberate racial profil-
ing.  This Note concludes by offering a draft activation policy 
for potential adoption by police departments to better use 
body-worn cameras to reduce racially biased police practices. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Racial bias in policing has been at the forefront of the 
national public debate since at least the 2014 shooting of 
Michael Brown in Ferguson and the ensuing Department of 
Justice investigation.1  The numerous subsequent incidents2 
of unarmed Black3 people dying at the hands of police have 
served, if nothing else, to keep the issue in the news.4  As the 
                                               
1 See Linda Sheryl Greene, Before and After Michael Brown—
Toward an End to Structural and Actual Violence, 49 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 1, 3–4, 9–16 (2015) (providing an account of how Michael Brown’s 
death may be seen to fit within broader trajectories of racialized police 
violence). 
2 See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., The Grand Jury and Police Violence 
Against Black Men, in POLICING THE BLACK MAN: ARREST, PROSECUTION, 
AND IMPRISONMENT 209 (Angela J. Davis ed., 2017) (overviewing police kill-
ings of Black men that have reached the grand jury stage); see also 
KIMBERLÉ WILLIAMS CRENSHAW & ANDREA J. RITCHIE, SAY HER NAME: 
RESISTING POLICE BRUTALITY AGAINST BLACK WOMEN (2015), http://static 
1.squarespace.com/static/53f20d90e4b0b80451158d8c/t/560c068ee4b0af26f727
41df/1443628686535/AAPF_SMN_Brief_Full_singles-min.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/BF4C-8V69] (providing an important corrective to the male-focused public 
narrative around these types of events by reporting on police violence against 
Black women). 
3 I use the adjectives “Black” and “African American” inter-
changeably for the same reason other writers in this field do, namely, be-
cause police processes do not differentiate between “types” of Blackness.  
See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model 
of Some of the Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479, 1480 n.1 (2016) (explaining the 
author’s semantic choices along similar lines). 
4 This Note focuses primarily on the problem of racial bias against 
Black people because it is this particular form of racism that catalyzed the 
body-worn camera movement.  This is not to ignore or diminish the effects 
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country looks to ways to combat this invidious problem, one 
“solution” has risen to particular prominence: police body-
worn cameras.5  Such is the momentum behind these devices 
that the movement has been described as “a police body cam-
era revolution.”6  Police departments across the country have 
piloted and mandated body-worn cameras, giving rise to a 
variety of different guidelines and policies.  This Note sur-
veys the body-worn camera policies of the ten largest metro-
politan police departments in the United States: New York, 
Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Houston, Washington, 
D.C., Dallas, Phoenix, Baltimore, and Miami-Dade.  Whilst 
each department’s policy covers everything from camera 
cleaning and maintenance to metadata storage, this Note 
focuses solely on “activation” requirements—that is, the 
policy provisions specifying events that officers are required 
to record on their cameras.7  Though activation requirements 
are relatively understudied, the only study conducted to date 
on the scope of officer discretion in activation highlights their 
importance.  The study found that giving officers discretion 
as to when to activate their cameras correlated with signifi-
cantly higher incidents of officer use of force.8  It is clear, 
then, that activation requirements are capable of affecting 
police behavior.  This Note’s ultimate aim is to assess the 
relative merits of different activation policies as against one 
                                               
of racially-biased policing on other minority communities.  On the dangers 
of “Black male exceptionalism,” see Paul Butler, Black Male Exceptionalism? 
The Problems and Potential of Black Male-Focused Interventions, 10 DU BOIS 
REV. 485 (2013). 
5 See Howard M. Wasserman, Moral Panics and Body Cameras, 
92 WASH. U. L. REV. 831, 832 (2015) (“[O]ne significant policy suggestion 
has emerged from the [Ferguson] controversy: equipping police officers 
with body cameras.”). 
6 Mary D. Fan, Justice Visualized: Courts and the Body Camera 
Revolution, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 897, 901 (2017). 
7 This Note focuses on activation policies rather than activation 
functionality on body-worn cameras.  When discussing activation policies, 
however, it is important to know that there can be a slight margin for er-
ror because some body-worn cameras have the capacity to retrieve thirty 
seconds of video, but not audio, from the time immediately prior to an officer 
commencing recording.  See, e.g., Operating Modes, AXON http://help.axon 
.com/hc/en-us/articles/221132167-Operating-modes [https://perma.cc/WV2V-86 
3N]. 
8 See Barak Ariel et al., Wearing Body Cameras Increases Assaults 
Against Officers and Does Not Reduce Police Use of Force: Results from a 
Global Multi-Site Experiment, 13 EUR. J. CRIMINOLOGY 744 (2016). 
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of the primary stated goals of the body-worn camera 
movement: reducing racially biased policing. 
The discussion will proceed in five parts.  Part II 
comprises a brief review of the existing literature on body-
worn camera activation policies.  Part III describes the prob-
lem of racial bias in policing and distinguishes two different 
forms of racial bias—deliberate racial profiling and implicit 
racial bias.  As this Note will describe, deliberate racial pro-
filing occurs when a police officer makes a conscious decision 
to treat someone less favorably because of their race, while 
implicit racial bias describes subconscious discriminatory 
behavior.  Part IV outlines three theories of body-worn cam-
eras as “racial change agents”9—a deterrence theory, an 
accountability theory, and a training theory.  
In the application and analysis of the above 
theoretical framework, in Part V, this Note begins by com-
paring the activation policies of the ten largest metropolitan 
police departments.10  The comparison shows that activation 
requirements vary significantly between departments, with 
some departments requiring officers to record most police-
civilian interactions and other departments affording their 
officers more discretion.  Part VI assesses the merits of the 
different policies when measured against the goal of reducing 
racially biased policing.  This Note argues that the most ef-
fective way to use body-worn cameras to reduce racial bias 
would be to mandate that the cameras be activated during 
all police-civilian interactions, with few exceptions.  This re-
form proposal is reified in a draft activation policy.  Finally, 
this Note proposes that any attempt at reforming body-worn 
camera activation policies must involve input from affected 
communities. 
 
II. EXISTING LITERATURE ON BODY-WORN CAMERA 
ACTIVATION POLICIES 
Much has been written about body-worn cameras in 
the short time they have been in operation, both by way of 
                                               
9 This terminology comes from Rashawn Ray et al., Can Cameras 
Stop the Killings? Racial Differences in Perceptions of the Effectiveness of 
Body-Worn Cameras in Police Encounters, 32 SOC. F. 1032, 1035 (2017). 
10 In addition to the discussion in Part V, the results of this study 
are tabulated in Appendixes A, B, and C.  The methodology is described in 
Appendix D. 
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commentary and empirical studies.11  The empirical studies 
to date have largely examined the effects of body-worn cam-
eras on rates of police use of force and instances of civilian 
complaints.12  Commentary has tended to focus on questions 
relating to Fourth Amendment compatibility,13 privacy,14 da-
ta retention,15 and public access to body-worn camera foot-
age.16  Little, however, has been written specifically on 
activation policies.17  If the basic hope for body-worn cameras 
                                               
11 See, e.g., Timothy I.C. Cubitt et al., Body-Worn Video: A 
Systematic Review of Literature, 50 AUSTRALIAN & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 379 
(2017) (providing a helpful summary of the literature). 
12 The major United States empirical studies to date are from 
Rialto, Mesa, Phoenix, Orlando, and Washington, D.C.  See Barak Ariel et 
al., The Effect of Police Body-Worn Cameras on Use of Force and Citizens’ 
Complaints Against the Police: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 31 J. 
QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 509 (2015); Justin T. Ready & Jacob T. N. 
Young, The Impact of On-Officer Video Cameras on Police–Citizen 
Contacts: Findings from a Controlled Experiment in Mesa, AZ, 11 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 445 (2015); CHARLES M. KATZ ET AL., CTR. FOR 
VIOLENCE PREVENTION & CMTY. SAFETY, EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF 
OFFICER WORN BODY CAMERAS IN THE PHOENIX POLICE DEPARTMENT (2014); 
Wesley G. Jennings et al., Evaluating the Impact of Police Officer Body-
Worn Cameras (BWCs) on Response-to-Resistance and Serious External 
Complaints: Evidence from the Orlando Police Department (OPD) 
Experience Utilizing a Randomized Controlled Experiment, 43 J. CRIM. 
JUST. 480 (2015); David Yokum et al., Evaluating the Effects of Police 
Body-Worn Cameras: A Randomized Controlled Trial (Oct. 20, 2017) 
(unpublished working paper), https://bwc.thelab.dc.gov/TheLabDC_MPD_ 
BWC_Working_Paper_10.20.17.pdf [https://perma.cc/99N6-RXRU]. 
13 See, e.g., Julian R. Murphy, Comment, Chilling: The 
Constitutional Implications of Body-Worn Cameras and Facial Recognition 
Technology at Public Protests, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2018). 
14 See, e.g., Bryce Clayton Newell, Collateral Visibility: A Socio-
Legal Study of Police Body-Camera Adoption, Privacy, and Public 
Disclosure in Washington State, 92 IND. L.J. 1329 (2017). 
15 See, e.g., Tod Newcombe, Body Worn Camera Data Storage: The 
Gorilla in the Room, GOVTECH (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.govtech.com/ 
dc/articles/body-worn-camera-data-storage-the-gorilla-in-the-room.html 
[https://perma.cc/35AV-SWT6]. 
16 See, e.g., Mary D. Fan, Privacy, Public Disclosure, Police Body 
Cameras: Policy Splits, 68 ALA. L. REV. 395 (2016). 
17 For existing literature touching on body-worn camera activation 
policies, see THE POLICING PROJECT, N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, REPORT TO 
THE NYPD SUMMARIZING PUBLIC FEEDBACK ON ITS PROPOSED BODY-WORN 
CAMERA POLICY 12–15 (2017); Fanny Coudert et al., Body-Worn Cameras 
for Police Accountability: Opportunities and Risks, 31 COMPUTER L. & 
SECURITY REV. 749, 758–59 (2015); LINDSAY MILLER ET AL., POLICE EXEC. 
RESEARCH FORUM, IMPLEMENTING A BODY-WORN CAMERA PROGRAM: 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 12–14 (2014); Wasserman, supra 
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is that, when they are recording, they will serve as an 
oversight mechanism to improve police behavior, then surely 
our first question should be: When will they be recording?  
Indeed, only one scholar has discussed the topic in any 
depth.  Over the course of two articles in 2016 and 2017, 
Mary Fan published the results of the first thorough compar-
ison of police body-worn camera policies in the United 
States.18  Comparing forty-two municipal police departments, 
Fan concluded that the policies differ widely with respect to 
privacy and release of footage but that there is a near 
consensus as to what must be recorded in the first place.19   
Building on Fan’s research, I conducted an updated 
comparison of body-worn camera activation policies with 
particular attention to the way in which these policies might 
curb racially biased policing.  This Note thus constitutes only 
the second scholarly comparison of body-worn camera activa-
tion policies and the first comprehensive exploration of the 
potential interaction of activation policies and racial bias.  
Before this comparison can occur, however, it is helpful to 
unpack exactly what “racial bias” means. 
 
III. THE PROBLEM: RACIALLY BIASED POLICING 
A perception of widespread racial bias in policing—
particularly in practices such as stop-and-frisk programs 
targeting Black pedestrians,20 the Ferguson Police Depart-
ment’s “predatory policing” of Black residents,21 and the 
                                               
note 5, at 842; Kelly Freund, Note, When Cameras Are Rolling: Privacy 
Implications of Body-Mounted Cameras on Police, 49 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. 
PROBS. 91, 110–12, 128–30 (2015); Karson Kampfe, Note, Police-Worn 
Body Cameras: Balancing Privacy and Accountability Through State and 
Police Department Action, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1153, 1175–78, 1196 (2015); and 
Diana Taylor, Note, Body Cameras for Police: When Should They Be 
Turned Off?, 6 L.A. PUB. INT. L.J. 42, 54–61 (2015). 
18 Fan, supra note 6; Fan, supra note 16. 
19 Fan, supra note 6, at 902, 929–34; Fan, supra note 16, at 426–30. 
20 See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(finding racially discriminatory stop-and-frisk practices in New York City 
to be unconstitutional). 
21 See CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF 
THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 2 (2015) (“Ferguson’s police and mu-
nicipal court practices both reflect and exacerbate existing racial biases, 
including racial stereotypes.  Ferguson’s own data establish clear racial 
disparities that adversely impact African Americans.  The evidence shows 
that discriminatory intent is part of the reason for these disparities.”); see 
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nationwide incidence of police shootings of unarmed Black 
civilians22—has significantly propelled the body-worn camera 
movement.  In response to these vastly different manifesta-
tions of racialized policing, the proposed solution has been 
largely the same: body-worn cameras.23  Although this policy 
response appears to be well-intentioned, it is problematic in 
its failure to account for two very different causes of discrim-
inatory police practices: deliberate racial profiling and 
implicit racial bias.  The distinction is important because the 
different kinds of racial bias will not necessarily be amenable 
to the same reform policies—they may require separate and 
distinct ameliorative strategies.24  Thus, in order for a body-
worn camera policy to effectively respond to racialized 
policing, it must address both deliberate racial profiling and 
implicit racial bias.  To envisage how this might be possible, 
we must first better understand the difference between 
deliberate and implicit racial bias. 
 
A. Deliberate Racial Profiling 
Deliberate racial profiling—also known as explicit or 
conscious bias—is the process by which people are intention-
ally treated differently because of their race.  In the policing 
context, a paradigmatic example is the practice of some 
United States police departments in the 1980’s and 1990’s of 
purposefully targeting Black and Latinx people for drug-
                                               
also Devon W. Carbado, From Stopping Black People to Killing Black 
People: The Fourth Amendment Pathways to Police Violence, 105 CALIF. L. 
REV. 125, 135 (2017) (discussing the racial dimensions to “predatory polic-
ing” like that previously practiced by the Ferguson Police Department). 
22 See sources cited supra note 2. 
23 See, e.g., Kami Chavis Simmons, Body-Mounted Police Cameras: 
A Primer on Police Accountability vs. Privacy, 58 HOW. L.J. 881, 887 (2015) 
(“Although body-mounted cameras could deter multiple types of impermissi-
ble conduct, these cameras could be extremely helpful in deterring racial 
profiling.”); see also Coudert et al., supra note 17, at 750, 756–57 (“[I]t is 
hoped that [body-worn cameras] will act as deterrent against . . . discrimi-
nation by police officers . . . .”); Katherine B. Spencer et al., Implicit Bias 
and Policing, 10 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 50, 58 (2016) 
(“Cameras also hold potential to have a deterrent effect on [racial] bias in 
policing.”). 
24 See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit 
Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969, 973 (2006) (advocating for a practice “of ‘debi-
asing’ actors through legal strategies that are designed to counteract bias-
es of various sorts across a variety of domains”). 
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related investigation, a practice illuminated by the mention 
of race in police department training materials.25  Another 
notorious example is the New York Police Department 
(NYPD) and Central Intelligence Agency’s post-9/11 strategy 
of surveilling and questioning men of Middle Eastern 
appearance at a higher rate than members of other racial 
groups.26  Today, many scholars view deliberate racial profil-
ing as less of a concern than implicit racial bias.27  Neverthe-
less, deliberate racial profiling remains a problem in policing 
and criminal justice and is of significant concern to the 
general public.28  
 
                                               
25 See David A. Harris, Racial Profiling Revisited: “Just Common 
Sense” in the Fight Against Terror?, 17 CRIM. JUST. 36, 38–39 (2002) (de-
scribing the federal Drug Enforcement Administration’s traffic stop poli-
cies and intelligence in the 1980’s which explicitly “blamed trafficking in 
particular drugs on identified ethnic groups”). 
26 See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations on 
the Fourth Report of the United States of America, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/USA/CO/4 (Apr. 23, 2014) (“[T]he Committee remains concerned 
about the practice of racial profiling and surveillance by law enforcement 
officials targeting certain ethnic minorities and the surveillance of Muslims, 
undertaken by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the New 
York Police Department (NYPD), in the absence of any suspicion of 
wrongdoing.”); see also JACK GLASER, SUSPECT RACE: CAUSES AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF RACIAL PROFILING 127–60 (2014) (describing racial pro-
filing of Middle Eastern men in post-9/11 counterterrorism policies). 
27 See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Patrick Rock, What Exposes 
African Americans to Police Violence?, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159, 162 
(2016) (“[C]onscious racial animosity likely only accounts for a small per-
centage of racially-motivated conduct.”); Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in 
the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1126 (2012) (“The problems of overt 
discrimination have received enormous attention from lawyers, judges, 
academics, and policymakers.  While explicit sexism, racism, and other 
forms of bias persist, they have become less prominent and public over the 
past century. . . . [L]ikely more pervasive, are questions surrounding im-
plicit bias . . . .”); Brian A. Nosek et al., Pervasiveness and Correlates of 
Implicit Attitudes and Stereotypes, 18 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 36, 58–60 
(2007) (analyzing the results of over 2.5 million online implicit bias tests 
and showing that implicit bias is more prevalent than explicit bias, at least 
when the latter is measured on a self-reporting basis). 
28 See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 561 
(2013) (“[T]he NYPD has an unwritten policy of targeting ‘the right people’ 
for stops.  In practice, the policy encourages the targeting of young [B]lack 
and Hispanic men . . . .  This is a form of racial profiling.” (footnote omitted)). 
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B. Implicit Racial Bias 
Implicit racial bias is an umbrella term attaching to a 
number of unconscious attitudes, stereotypes, and prejudices 
about people of different races.29  Our understanding of im-
plicit racial bias is based on the “science of implicit cognition 
[that] suggests that actors do not always have conscious, 
intentional control over the processes of social perception, 
impression formation, and judgment that motivate their ac-
tions.”30  In the policing context, implicit racial bias most 
commonly describes the process by which police officers 
unconsciously associate Black civilians with criminality or 
dangerousness.31  Implicit racial bias operates subconscious-
ly despite a police officer’s best intentions.  As L. Song 
Richardson has explained, “implicit stereotypes can cause an 
officer who harbors no conscious racial animosity and who 
rejects using race as a proxy for criminality to unintentional-
ly treat individuals differently based solely upon their physi-
cal appearance.”32  Implicit racial bias can infect police 
interactions with Black civilians in deeply troubling ways.  
Two such potential manifestations discussed here have been 
chosen for their relevance to the genesis of the body-worn 
camera movement: the increased scrutiny of Black people in 
daily life and the increased use of force against Black 
civilians. 
First, implicit racial bias can contribute to increased 
police scrutiny of Black civilians—for example, by police-
initiated questioning of Black people on the street or by the 
more invasive practice of Terry stops.33  It is well established 
                                               
29 Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit 
Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 951 (2006). 
30 Id. at 946. 
31 See Carbado & Rock, supra note 27, at 167–73 (“[In the policing 
context,] African-American men are associated not only with criminality but 
also with violence and dangerousness.”); Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing 
Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 876, 876 (2004) (“The stereotype of Black Americans as violent and 
criminal has been documented by social psychologists for almost 60 years.”). 
32 L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 
95 MINN. L. REV. 2035, 2039 (2011). 
33 “Terry stops” describe the police practice of stopping civilians 
for questioning and/or frisking, despite the absence of probable cause.  The 
practice is named after the Supreme Court case in which it was deemed 
constitutional: Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
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that police subject Black people to these practices at a higher 
rate than other civilians.34  This racial disproportionality can 
plausibly be attributed, at least in part, to police officers’ 
implicit racial biases, whereby officers are more likely to pay 
attention to, and thus approach, a Black civilian than a 
White civilian.35  This vein of implicit bias has been called 
“attentional bias”36 and is borne out in studies showing that 
Black individuals both attract attention more often37 and 
retain attention for longer38 than White individuals.  As 
Richardson has written: 
 
Implicit biases affect whether behavior catches 
attention in the first place and whether the 
observer will interpret that behavior as suffi-
                                               
34 See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 560 
(2013) (“Blacks and Hispanics are more likely than whites to be stopped 
[by the NYPD] within precincts and census tracts, even after controlling 
for other relevant variables. . . . Together, these results show that [B]lacks 
are likely targeted for stops based on a lesser degree of objectively founded 
suspicion than [W]hites.”); Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, Following the 
Script: Narratives of Suspicion in Terry Stops in Street Policing, 82 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 51, 55 (2015) (observing race-based suspicion leading to stops and 
searches of Black and Latinx people in New York); David A. Harris, Factors 
for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means Stopped and 
Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 679–80 (1994) (“Police are much more likely to 
stop African-American men than [W]hite men.”); Anthony C. Thompson, 
Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 956, 983–90 (1999) (reviewing scientific literature on stereotyping 
and analyzing how racial stereotypes likely played a role in the stop under 
review in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). 
35 See Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken 
Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 457, 481 (2000) (“The prominence of race in the decision to stop citizens 
may not rise to the threshold of racial profiling, but it does seem to create 
a racial classification of ‘suspicion.’”); Richardson, supra note 32, at 2052 
(“Based on the science, it is reasonable to conclude that the police target, 
stop, and search [B]lacks more often than [W]hites based on the operation 
of implicit biases.”). 
36 Eberhardt et al., supra note 31, at 881. 
37 See Sophie Trawalter et al., Attending to Threat: Race-Based 
Patterns of Selective Attention, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1322, 
1322 (2008) (“[T]he stereotype that young Black men are threatening and 
dangerous has become so robust and ingrained in the collective American 
unconscious that Black men now capture attention . . . .”). 
38 See Eberhardt et al., supra note 31, at 887 (describing a study 
which bore out the researchers’ hypothesis that racial biases led partici-
pants to look at Black faces quicker than White faces and to look at Black 
faces for longer than White faces). 
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ciently suspicious to warrant further investi-
gation. . . .  Hence, police attention may be 
drawn to [B]lack individuals . . . regardless of 
whether these individuals are engaged in 
suspicious behavior.39 
 
Secondly, implicit racial bias can result in higher 
rates of police use of force against Black civilians.  Studies 
explain this manifestation of implicit racial bias by demon-
strating that people, including police officers, are more likely 
to view a Black person’s behavior as threatening.40  One such 
study suggests that, as a result of social learning, people are 
more likely to respond fearfully to Black than to White indi-
viduals.41  Another study suggests that people will more 
readily detect hostility in Black faces than in White faces 
with identical expressions.42  A slew of “shooter bias” 
simulation studies have shown that people are generally 
quicker to shoot armed and unarmed Black people than they 
are to shoot similarly situated White people.43  This review of 
                                               
39 Richardson, supra note 32, at 2052–53 (footnote omitted). 
40 See Nosek et al., supra note 27, at 56 (“[M]ost participants [of 
over 2.5 million online implicit bias tests] showed stronger associations of 
Blacks with weapons and Whites with harmless objects compared to the 
reverse pairing . . . .”). 
41 See Matthew D. Lieberman et al., An fMRI Investigation of 
Race-Related Amygdala Activity in African-American and Caucasian-
American Individuals, 8 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 720 (2005) (reporting re-
sults of a study using functional magnetic resonance imaging to show that 
both Black and White participants recorded higher levels of amygdala ac-
tivity in response to Black targets than to White targets; the amygdala is, 
broadly speaking, the section of the brain associated with fear and survival 
instincts). 
42 Kurt Hugenberg & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Facing Prejudice: 
Implicit Prejudice and the Perception of Facial Threat, 14 PSYCHOL. SCI. 640, 
643 (2003). 
43 See, e.g., Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma: 
Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314, 1327 (2002) (“In four studies, 
participants showed a bias to shoot African American targets more rapidly 
and/or more frequently than White targets.”); Anthony G. Greenwald et 
al., Targets of Discrimination: Effects of Race on Responses to Weapons 
Holders, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 399, 405 (2003) (“Race of 
target can affect both (a) perceptual ability to discriminate a weapon from 
a harmless object and (b) bias to respond as if a weapon is present.”); 
Melody S. Sadler et al., The World Is Not Black and White: Racial Bias in 
the Decision to Shoot in a Multiethnic Context, 68 J. SOC. ISSUES 286, 297–
98 (2012) (replicating early “shooter bias” results in samples of police 
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the psychological literature reveals that implicit racial bias 
operates in a very different way than deliberate racial profil-
ing.  Whereas deliberate racial profiling involves conscious 
decisions and behaviors intended to negatively discriminate 
against Black people, implicit racial biases are instinctive 
attitudes and responses operating at a subconscious level. 
To address the root causes of racialized policing, we 
must adopt a multifaceted understanding of racial bias that 
integrates both subconscious and conscious discrimination 
against Black civilians.  We may not always know whether a 
racially skewed policing phenomenon—such as stop-and-
frisk—is the product of deliberate or implicit racial bias; so, 
we need to be prepared to respond to both possibilities.  
Thus, any body-worn camera policy that hopes to reduce the 
incidence of racially motivated policing must be calibrated to 
change both deliberate and implicit racial bias.  Proponents 
of body-worn cameras generally advance three theories as to 
how this change might be achieved: a deterrence theory, an 
accountability theory, and a training theory.  
 
IV. A SOLUTION? BODY-WORN CAMERAS AND THREE 
THEORIES OF CHANGE 
Claims that body-worn cameras can mitigate “the 
implicit and explicit bias against people of color and particu-
larly African American youth”44 are usually made by refer-
ence to three theories of change.  This Note refers to these 
as the deterrence theory, the accountability theory, and the 
training theory. 
 
                                               
officers).  But see Lois James et al., Racial and Ethnic Bias in Decisions to 
Shoot Seen Through a Stronger Lens: Experimental Results from High-
Fidelity Laboratory Simulations, 10 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 323, 
336 (2014) (finding that, although subjects held subconscious racial biases 
associating Black people with threat, these biases did not express 
themselves in decisions to shoot.). 
44 Press Release, Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law et al., 
A Unified Statement of Action to Promote Reform and Stop Police Abuse (Aug. 
18, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/black_leaders_joint 
_statement_-_final_-_8-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/W78J-JJLX]. 
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A. Body-Worn Cameras and the Deterrence 
Theory of Change 
The deterrence theory postulates that when police 
officers understand their actions to be reviewable, they are 
deterred from violating commonly held norms of conduct.45  
The first randomized controlled trial of body-worn cameras 
appears to have borne out this hypothesis.  In that trial, 
researchers found that officers wearing cameras were in-
volved in fewer use-of-force incidents than an analogous con-
trol group without cameras.46  The researchers concluded 
plausibly that the officers wearing cameras behaved better, 
and resorted to force less often, because of their awareness 
that they were being “watched.”47  There is survey evidence 
to suggest that the public strongly believes that body-worn 
cameras are capable of having this effect.48  Though it re-
mains true that not everyone accepts the plausibility of the 
                                               
45 See, e.g., THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, GUIDELINES FOR THE USE 
OF BODY-WORN CAMERAS BY LAW ENFORCEMENT: A GUIDE TO PROTECTING 
COMMUNITIES AND PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES 12 (2016) (“With respect to 
officer behavior, body cameras may deter officer misconduct, including 
improper use of force, unjustified stops or arrests, and other violations of 
the law or department policy.”); Barak Ariel et al., Report: Increases in 
Police Use of Force in the Presence of Body-Worn Cameras Are Driven by 
Officer Discretion: A Protocol-Based Subgroup Analysis of Ten Randomized 
Experiments, 12 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 453, 455 (2016) (“The 
theoretical basis for the use of cameras—that being monitored changes 
behavior—is deterrence theory. . . . BWCs increase the perceived certainty 
of apprehension for rule violations. . . . When BWCs are actually turned on 
and appropriately activated, they can efficiently detect rule violations and 
law breaking by officers . . . and this process can send a credible deterrence 
threat.” (citations omitted)); Ariel et al., supra note 8, at 747–50 (reviewing 
literature on deterrence theory and applying it to the use of body-worn 
cameras); Coudert et al., supra note 17, at 750, 756–57 (“[B]y exposing bad 
. . . behaviour, it is hoped that [body-worn cameras] will act as deterrent 
against the [mis]use of force and discrimination by police officers . . . 
because of this deterrent effect, body-worn cameras are expected to 
improve policing . . . .”). 
46 Ariel et al., supra note 12, at 523. 
47 Id. at 526 (“We interpret this to reflect a fundamental tendency 
of humans to exhibit more desirable behaviors when they know they are 
under surveillance . . . .”). 
48 THE POLICING PROJECT, supra note 17, at 10 (reporting that eighty-
nine percent of respondents to a survey of 2500 people believed that body-
worn cameras would improve the conduct of police officers interacting with 
members of the public). 
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deterrence function of body-worn cameras,49 there is such 
broad support for the theory among the public, policymakers, 
and scholars that it is likely to inform any public discussion 
about body-worn camera policies.  
 
B. Body-Worn Cameras and the Accountability 
Theory of Change 
Meanwhile, the accountability theory is based on the 
simple idea that when a person is held accountable for unsat-
isfactory behavior, they are more likely to refrain from that 
behavior in the future.  Body-worn cameras increase the like-
lihood that an officer acting on racial biases will be discov-
ered, investigated, and disciplined.50  Importantly, under the 
accountability theory, body-worn cameras not only improve 
the behavior of the individual officer disciplined, but also im-
prove that of other officers who, having seen the disciplinary 
consequence, will modify their behavior to avoid disciplinary 
action.  
 
                                               
49 See, e.g., Ben Bradford & Jonathan Jackson, Enabling and 
Constraining Police Power: On the Moral Regulation of Policing, in 
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE ETHICS 219, 226 (Jonathan 
Jacobs & Jonathan Jackson eds., 2017) (“Almost all discussion of the influ-
ence of BWV and other recording technology on police officers has revolved 
around rational choice and deterrence theory—the presence of cameras 
deters them from behaviours they might otherwise have engaged in simply 
because the cameras increase the risk of censure and sanction.  The empha-
sis is, then, on extrinsic motivations for behaviour that, we argue below, 
are not necessarily particularly strong or efficacious.  On this basis alone 
increased surveillance of police is unlikely to solve on its own the problems 
thrown up by stop and search (and many other practices besides).”). 
50 THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 45, at 13 (“[Video evi-
dence] allows departments to more rapidly take appropriate disciplinary 
action in response to misconduct.”); Coudert et al., supra note 17, at 755 
(“As accountability mechanism, [body-worn cameras] could act in two ways: 
to apportion responsibility and to encourage learning.”); see also David A. 
Harris, Picture This: Body-Worn Video Devices (“Head Cams”) as Tools for 
Ensuring Fourth Amendment Compliance by Police, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 
357, 363–64 (2010) (discussing the use of body-worn cameras to substantiate 
civilian complaints against police officers). 
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1. Wide Acceptance of the Accountability 
Theory 
Police departments, the public, and the judiciary all 
appear to subscribe to the accountability theory.  As shown 
in Appendix A, eight of the ten police departments included 
in the comparative analysis included “accountability” or 
“transparency” as an objective of their body-worn camera pol-
icies.  Furthermore, the Police Executive Research Forum 
(PERF) interviewed forty police executives whose depart-
ments had implemented, or considered implementing, body-
worn cameras.  PERF registered a widespread belief among 
the executives that body-worn cameras could enhance ac-
countability and transparency.51  Public support for the ac-
countability theory is evident in two separate studies.  One 
survey of public responses to a draft NYPD policy recorded 
respondents’ hopes that body-worn cameras would enable the 
department to better identify police officer misconduct.52  
Another survey, this time of Maryland community members, 
recorded similar sentiments that body-worn cameras would 
improve police accountability.53  Finally, at least some mem-
bers of the judiciary believe in the accountability theory, as 
indicated by the inclusion of body-worn cameras in judicial 
orders following complaints of racially biased policing in 
Ferguson, Baltimore, Newark, and New York.54  In the litiga-
tion surrounding the NYPD’s racialized stop-and-frisk policy, 
the trial court justified its inclusion of body-worn cameras in 
the final order by reasoning: 
 
[Body-worn cameras] will provide a contempo-
raneous, objective record of stops and frisks, 
allowing for the review of officer conduct . . . . 
                                               
51 See MILLER ET AL., supra note 17, at 5 (“The police executives 
whom PERF consulted cited many ways in which body-worn cameras have 
helped their agencies strengthen accountability and transparency.”). 
52 THE POLICING PROJECT, supra note 17, at 10. 
53 See Ray et al., supra note 9, at 10–11 (quoting respondents to a 
survey about body-worn cameras who believe that they will improve police 
accountability). 
54 Consent Decree at 52–57, United States v. City of Ferguson, No. 
4:16-cv-00180-CDP (E.D. Mo. Apr. 19, 2016), ECF No. 41; Consent Decree at 
95–96, United States v. Police Dep’t of Balt., No. 1:17-cv-00099-JKB (D. Md. 
Jan. 12, 2017), ECF No. 2-2; Consent Decree at 38–39, United States v. City 
of Newark, No. 2:16-cv-01731-MCA-MAH (D.N.J. 2016), ECF No. 4-1. 
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[that] may either confirm or refute the belief of 
some minorities that they have been stopped 
simply as a result of their race . . . .55 
 
C. Body-Worn Cameras and the Training Theory 
of Change   
Some proponents of body-worn cameras also advance 
a final theory of change, the training theory.  The training 
theory is rooted in a belief that body-worn cameras allow po-
lice to develop training programs specifically targeted at par-
ticular practices of racially biased policing.  At the level of an 
individual officer, body-worn camera footage may allow a 
supervisor to identify racially biased behavior—such as stop-
ping Black civilians more regularly than White civilians—
and require that officer to engage in training designed to 
change this behavior.  At a department-wide level, aggregate 
data derived from body-worn camera footage may reveal that 
there is a widespread or systemic problem of racial bias that 
would require the entire force to engage in remedial 
training.56  
There is evidence that police believe in the training 
theory of change: Appendix A shows that nine of the ten po-
lice departments in my comparative analysis included 
“training” as an objective of their body-worn camera policies.  
The theory appears to have the support not just of the policy 
drafters, but also of frontline police officers.  One survey con-
ducted after a body-worn camera study recorded that almost 
eighty percent of police officers agreed that reviewing their 
own conduct on body-worn camera footage would help them 
improve their behavior.57   
 
                                               
55 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013).  
56 See MILLER ET AL., supra note 17, at 8–9 (describing body-worn 
cameras as a useful tool to train individual officers and “to address wide-
reaching structural problems within the department”); Harris, supra note 
50, at 364–65 (“[S]upervisors could use the recordings for more general 
(i.e., not complaint responsive) assessment, training, and disciplinary deci-
sions.”). 
57 Jennings et al., supra note 12, at 484 (recording that 79.5% of 
officers involved in a body-worn camera study agreed, in a post-study 
survey, that “reviewing BWC video after an incident would help them . . . 
identify issues that they may need improvement on”). 
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D. A Prerequisite for Change: Footage Is 
Reviewed  
Before departing the topic of theories of change, some 
concluding comments are in order.  Each of the above theo-
ries of change can only operate effectively if internal supervi-
sors or external auditors not only record, but actually review 
body-worn camera footage.58  If someone is not reviewing 
the footage, then police officers will not be deterred or disci-
plined, and they will not receive targeted training.  Though 
some critics have doubted that police departments have the 
funds and resources to regularly review countless hours of 
body-worn camera footage,59 there is reason to believe that 
police departments are systematically reviewing such foot-
age.  A nationwide survey of 254 police departments found 
that ninety-four percent used body-worn camera footage to 
train officers and assist in administrative reviews.60  This 
suggests that there are already procedures in place laying a 
foundation for each of the three theories of change just postu-
lated.  However, before further examining how these theories 
of change might inform the ideal body-worn camera activa-
tion policy, it is helpful to survey the policies that are 
currently in place. 
 
                                               
58 See Coudert et al., supra note 17, at 757 (“[The deployment of 
body-worn cameras] should be accompanied by organizational [sic] measures 
ensuring that police officers receive sufficient and meaningful feedback 
from their supervisors after incidents . . . .  In that sense, body-worn 
cameras can also act as [a] forward-looking mechanism, to encourage 
learning.”); Developments in the Law—Policing, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1706, 
1802, 1802 n.55 (2015) (“But this benefit is contingent on departmental 
review policies, as some police departments only allow supervisors to ac-
cess footage if a civilian complaint has been made—prohibiting random 
screenings of officer conduct in the field.”).  
59 See Spencer et al., supra note 23, at 58 (“[A]nalyzing thousands 
of hours of audio and video recordings can be logistically complicated and 
prohibitively costly.”). 
60 MILLER ET AL., supra note 17, at 7 (“Many police agencies are 
discovering that body-worn cameras can serve as a useful training tool to 
help improve officer performance.  For example, agencies are using footage 
from body-worn cameras to provide scenario-based training, to evaluate 
the performance of new officers in the field, and to identify new areas in 
which training is needed.”). 
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V. ACTIVATION POLICIES IN THE TEN LARGEST 
METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENTS 
Body-worn cameras do not have a long history in the 
United States.  First trialed in continental Europe and the 
United Kingdom,61 body-worn cameras began to enter United 
States police departments in the late 2000’s.62  The pilot 
programs and initial trials of these devices proceeded on a 
city-by-city basis rather than as a uniform national rollout.  
The result has been a lack of uniformity in policies and pro-
cedures.63  Indeed, some departments appear to lack any pol-
icies at all.64  Perhaps because of the piecemeal and localized 
nature of police body-worn camera programs, there has been 
little scholarly effort directed at comparing and critiquing 
the policies governing the use of these devices.  Mary Fan’s 
pioneering work has gone some way toward improving this 
area of academic study. 
Fan looked at the municipal police departments 
serving the largest 100 cities in the United States, of which 
eighty-eight had used or planned to use body-worn camer-
as.65  As of December 2015, the date of Fan’s study, only thir-
ty-nine departments had publicly available guidelines.66  
Three other police departments were located in states that 
had legislative guidelines regarding body-worn cameras.67  
Accordingly, Fan coded and compared the guidelines for a 
total of forty-two police departments.  My December 2017 
survey of the body-worn camera policies of the ten largest 
                                               
61 See Coudert et al., supra note 17, at 751–53 (describing use of 
body-worn cameras by police departments in the United Kingdom); Kampfe, 
supra note 17, at 1156–57 (describing the history of body-worn cameras in 
Denmark and the United Kingdom). 
62 Harris, supra note 50, at 361–62 (summarizing the emergence 
of body-worn cameras in the United States). 
63 See Kampfe, supra note 17, at 1155 (tracking the rapid imple-
mentation of body-worn cameras and suggesting that there is little, if any, 
policy uniformity). 
64 See MILLER ET AL., supra note 17, at 2 (“PERF received responses 
from 254 departments . . .  Of the 63 agencies that reported using body-worn 
cameras, nearly one-third did not have a written policy governing body-worn 
camera usage.  Many police executives reported that their hesitance to imple-
ment a written policy was due to a lack of guidance on what the policies 
should include . . . .”). 
65 Fan, supra note 16, at 426; Fan, supra note 6, at 931. 
66 Fan, supra note 16, at 426; Fan, supra note 6, at 931. 
67 Fan, supra note 16, at 426; Fan, supra note 6, at 931. 
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metropolitan police departments in the United States builds 
on Fan’s research. 
My findings, which are discussed further below, align 
with Fan’s insofar as they identify two primary models for 
body-worn camera activation policies: “limited discretion” 
policies and “minimal discretion” policies.  As the labeling 
suggests, the point of differentiation between these two mod-
els is the degree of discretion they afford police officers.  
Limited discretion policies allow officers more autonomy as 
to what they need to record on their cameras; minimal dis-
cretion policies allow officers less autonomy.  The fact that 
discretion is the point of difference between the two models 
should not be surprising.  Discretion has long been a signifi-
cant topic of debate in modern theories of policing.  On the 
one hand, it is argued that individual police officer discretion 
should be reduced in order to ensure that the law is applied 
equally to everyone rather than applied variably according to 
the whim of a particular officer.68  On the other hand, advo-
cates of discretion suggest that it is necessary to ensure that 
police officers are able to respond flexibly to different circum-
stances and thus to avoid the harshness of blindly applied 
universal rules.69  As this Note will discuss, these competing 
views of discretion underlie the two common models of body-
worn camera activation policies. 
 
A. Limited Discretion Activation Policies  
Limited discretion activation policies operate by pre-
sumptively providing police officers discretion as to whether 
or not to record their activities while on duty.70  This pre-
sumption of officer discretion is only displaced in specific 
circumstances (in which recording is mandatory).  An illus-
trative limited discretion policy is that of the NYPD, which 
states: 
                                               
68 K. C. DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION 145 (1975). 
69 Wayne R. La Fave, The Need for Discretion, in LAW AND THE 
LAWLESS: A READER IN CRIMINOLOGY 299 (1969). 
70 Cf. Fan, supra note 16, at 427 (“A limited-discretion model cur-
tails officer discretion by requiring recording of several specified law en-
forcement activities, while leaving some situations up to officer discretion.”); 
Fan, supra note 6, at 931 (“Under a limited discretion model, police are 
directed to record specified enforcement activities and given discretion over 
whether to record at other times.”). 
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Activate BWC prior to engaging in, or assisting 
another uniformed member of the service with, 
the following police actions: 
a. Arrests 
b. Summonses . . . 
c. Vehicle stops 
d. Interactions with persons suspected of 
criminal activity 
e. A search of an individual and/or his/her 
belongings . . . 
f. Interactions with an emotionally dis-
turbed person 
g. Use of force . . . 
h. Public interactions that escalate and 
become adversarial 
. . . . 
Uniformed members of the service may record 
other official activities when, in the uniformed 
member’s judgment, it would be beneficial to 
record . . . .71  
 
This NYPD policy is characteristic of the limited discretion 
model because there is no generalized prescription requiring 
mandatory recording as there is, for instance, in the Chicago 
Police Department (“the Chicago PD”) policy reproduced be-
low.72  Instead, the NYPD policy grants a general discretion 
to officers as to whether to record their activities and only 
displaces this discretion in the specific circumstances listed 
in subsections a through h.  The limited discretion model 
places significant trust in the individual police officer to 
make the right “judgment” about whether it is “beneficial” to 
record.  In this sense, the NYPD policy can be understood to 
come down on the pro-discretion side of the long-raging de-
bate about the desirability of discretion in modern policing.  
As the following section shows, the Chicago PD can be seen 
to fall into the opposing anti-discretion camp. 
 
                                               
71 NYPD, DRAFT 16, PILOT PROGRAM—USE OF BODY-WORN 
CAMERAS, §§ 5, 8 (2017) (emphasis added). 
72 CHI. POLICE DEP’T, SPECIAL ORDER S03-14, BODY WORN CAMERAS 
(2018).  The Chicago policy states: “The decision to electronically record a 
law-enforcement-related encounter is mandatory, not discretionary, except 
where specifically indicated.”  Id. § III(A)(1) (emphasis added). 
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B. Minimal Discretion Activation Policies  
The other dominant type of body-worn camera activa-
tion policy among United States police departments is a 
minimal discretion policy.73  Such policies start from a pre-
sumption that all enforcement activities will be recorded, 
subject only to narrow exceptions.74  An example of a minimal 
discretion model can be seen in the Chicago PD policy, which 
states: 
 
1. The decision to electronically record a law-
enforcement-related encounter is mandato-
ry, not discretionary, except where specifi-
cally indicated. 
2. The Department member will activate the 
system . . . at the beginning of an incident 
and will record the entire incident for all 
law-enforcement-related activities. 
. . . . 
3. A Department member may utilize discre-
tion to activate the BWC for non-law-
enforcement-related activities [including] 
. . . community caretaking functions . . . .75  
 
The difference between the limited and minimal discretion 
policies is illustrated by the fundamentally different starting 
point of the Chicago PD policy as compared to the earlier-
quoted NYPD policy.  In a limited discretion model like the 
NYPD’s, the default position is voluntary recording; whereas 
in a minimal discretion model like the Chicago PD’s, the de-
fault position is mandatory recording.  Thus, in the terms of 
the discretion debate adverted to above, the Chicago PD’s 
                                               
73 Fan prefers to label this sort of policy as a “highly-limited-
discretion model.”  See Fan, supra note 16, at 427; Fan, supra note 6, at 932.  
Allyson Roy prefers the language of “a strict-control policy.”  See Allyson Roy, 
On-Officer Video Cameras: Examining the Effects of Police Department Policy 
and Assignment on Camera Use and Activation 12 (May 2014) (unpublished 
M.S. thesis, Arizona State University), https://repository.asu.edu/attachments/ 
134979/content/Roy_asu_0010N_13803.pdf [https://perma.cc/BEA5-QFNG]. 
74 Cf. Fan, supra note 16, at 427 (“This highly-limited-discretion 
approach requires that body cameras record during all enforcement en-
counters with the public, with only limited exceptions.”); Fan, supra note 6, at 
932. 
75 CHI. POLICE DEP’T, SPECIAL ORDER S03-14, BODY WORN CAMERAS 
§ III(A)(1)–(3) (2018) (emphasis added). 
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minimal discretion policy can be seen to be more concerned 
with reducing police officer discretion and ensuring uniform 
policy application than with allowing officer flexibility in re-
sponding to different situations.  Having described the two 
common models of body-worn camera activation policy, it is 
now possible to assess their relative popularity. 
 
C. A Trend Toward Reducing Police Officer 
Discretion 
In Fan’s 2015 study, the vast majority (eighty percent) 
of police departments opted for the policy that afforded 
officers more discretion about what to record on their 
cameras—the limited discretion policy.76  These results are at 
odds with the results of my smaller, more recent study in 
which only twenty percent of departments afforded their 
officers such discretion, as shown in Appendix B.  This signif-
icant difference suggests that, since 2015, large metropolitan 
police departments have been moving increasingly to reduce 
police officer discretion as to what must be recorded on their 
body-worn cameras.  The implications of this development for 
racial bias are discussed in Part VI, where this Note argues 
that reducing police officer discretion even further will result 
in activation policies best suited to combating racially biased 
policing.  Before commencing that discussion, however, it is 
necessary to qualify the endorsement of the limited/minimal 
discretion binary. 
 
D. Gradations of Discretion 
The apparent binary between limited and minimal 
discretion policies outlined above, and in Fan’s work, is 
somewhat reductive.  A closer analysis of the specific phrase-
ology of the policies reveals significant gradations of record-
ing requirements, even within policies on the same side of 
the limited/minimal equation.  For example, compare the 
above-quoted Chicago PD policy, which requires mandatory 
recording of all enforcement activities, with the minimal dis-
cretion policy of the Baltimore Police Department (“the 
Baltimore PD”), which requires mandatory recording of all 
                                               
76 Fan, supra note 6, at 932. 
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investigative and enforcement activities.77  On its face, the 
Baltimore PD’s inclusion of “investigative activities” signifi-
cantly extends its mandatory recording requirements beyond 
those of the Chicago PD.  The Baltimore PD policy would 
appear to require recording of, for example, all preliminary 
civilian inquiries, door knocks, witness interviews, crime-
scene investigations, and evidence collection activities 
(unless covered by an enumerated exclusion).  The purpose of 
adverting to the shades of discretion even within the same 
policy model is to emphasize that the optimal body-worn 
camera policy will be drafted with attention to whether each 
word, clause, and concept enlarges or reduces police officer 
discretion.  It is not enough to simply endorse one model or 
the other in the abstract.  With this in mind, the next section 
turns to consider how activation policies might best be draft-
ed to address deliberate and implicit racial bias.  
 
VI. ASSESSING ACTIVATION POLICIES AGAINST THE 
STATED GOAL OF REDUCING RACIALLY BIASED 
POLICING 
The preceding discussion introduced the dual problem 
of deliberate racial profiling and implicit racial bias; ex-
plained the potential solution of body-worn cameras by refer-
ence to three theories of change; and surveyed the current 
array of body-worn camera activation policies.  In Sections VI.A 
and VI.B, this Part will now analyze the most effective way 
in which a policy might leverage the theories of change to 
reduce deliberate and implicit racial bias.  Section VI.C will 
give special consideration to activation requirements for 
“consensual”78 interactions between police and civilians be-
cause of the heightened risk of racial bias manifesting in 
                                               
77 Compare CHI. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 75, with BALT. POLICE 
DEP’T, POLICY 824, BODY WORN CAMERAS PILOT PROGRAM 2 (2015). 
78 This Note considers “consent” in the stop-and-search context to 
be a legal fiction with little connection to everyday understandings of con-
sent.  Accordingly, this Note uses quotation marks around the word “con-
sent” and its derivatives when the legal concept is being described.  Cf. 
Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1609, 1662 (2012) (noting the authors’ deliberate use of quotation 
marks around the word “consent” in their article); Alafair S. Burke, 
Consent Searches and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, 67 FLA. L. REV. 
509, 513 n.12 (2015) (collecting some of the scholarly literature that insists 
on quotation marks around the word “consent” in the policing context). 
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these interactions.  Finally, Section VI.D introduces a draft 
activation policy for consideration by interested police de-
partments, policymakers, and affected communities. 
 
A. Activation Requirements and Deliberate 
Racial Profiling  
Each of the three theories of change—deterrence, 
accountability, and training—relies for its effectiveness on 
police officers activating their body-worn cameras.  If a cam-
era is not activated during an act of deliberate racial profil-
ing, then the camera is serving little deterrence function; it is 
not going to catalyze a disciplinary response and it will not 
result in any responsive training.79  The necessary implica-
tion of this observation is that the more often cameras are 
recording, the more effective they will be in reducing deliber-
ate racial profiling.  Taken to its fullest extent, this logic 
suggests that the activation policy that would most likely 
reduce deliberate racial profiling would be one that requires 
police officers to activate their cameras for the entirety of 
their shift.80  This can be labeled a “continuous recording” 
policy. 
 
1. The Advantages of Continuous 
Recording  
Barak Ariel, the leading empirical researcher in the 
field, and his coauthors have advocated for exactly this ap-
proach, arguing that “cameras should remain on throughout 
                                               
79 But see Barak Ariel et al., “Contagious Accountability”: A Global 
Multisite Randomized Controlled Trial on the Effect of Police Body-Worn 
Cameras on Citizens’ Complaints Against the Police, 44 CRIM. JUST. & 
BEHAV. 293 (2017) (hypothesizing that body-worn cameras may in fact 
influence officer behavior even when they are not recording, because offic-
ers will become so accustomed to the oversight of body-worn cameras that 
they will assume constant surveillance, either from their own device or 
from that of another officer; this possibility does not undermine my focus 
on activation policies—if we want to increase “contagious accountability,” 
then we need expansive activation policies that encourage officers to as-
sume that there will always be a camera recording). 
80 Cf. Bryce Clayton Newell, Crossing Lenses: Policing’s New 
Visibility and the Role of “Smartphone Journalism” as a Form of Freedom-
Preserving Reciprocal Surveillance, 2014 J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 59, 85 (2014) 
(suggesting that if body-worn cameras are “always on” they will better 
“serve to support citizen oversight and law enforcement accountability”). 
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the entire shift—that is, during each and every interaction 
with citizens.”81  The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 
has also recognized that, “from an accountability perspective, 
the ideal policy for body-worn cameras would be for continu-
ous recording throughout a police officer’s shift.”82  To require 
anything other than continuous recording reduces the capac-
ity of cameras to protect against deliberate racial profiling, 
because an officer can avoid detection by simply not activat-
ing their camera.  A number of scholars and civil rights or-
ganizations have expressed concern about this possibility.83  
The ACLU has noted: 
 
[P]olicies and technology must be designed to 
ensure that police cannot ‘edit on the fly’—i.e., 
choose which encounters to record with limit-
less discretion.  If police are free to turn the 
cameras on and off as they please, the camer-
as’ role in providing a check and balance 
against police power will shrink and they will 
no longer become a net benefit.84 
 
The public shares this concern.  In the Policing Project’s sur-
vey of more than 25,000 people in New York City, “a 
                                               
81 Ariel et al., supra note 45, at 461. 
82 JAY STANLEY, ACLU, POLICE BODY-MOUNTED CAMERAS: WITH 
RIGHT POLICIES IN PLACE, A WIN FOR ALL 3 (2015), https://www.aclu.org/ 
sites/default/files/assets/police_body-mounted_cameras-v2.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/ML4F-RXRB].  
83 See, e.g., Emmeline Taylor, Lights, Camera, Redaction . . . 
Police Body-Worn Cameras: Autonomy, Discretion and Accountability, 14 
SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 128, 129 (2016) (“The ability of officers to ‘edit on 
the fly’ fundamentally undermines any potential benefits the cameras in-
troduce.”); Jay Stanley, Police Body Cameras: The Lessons of Albuquerque, 
ACLU: FREE FUTURE (Mar. 24, 2015, 11:30 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/ 
police-body-cameras-lessons-albuquerque [https://perma.cc/3CQQ-424Y] (“In 
Albuquerque the police have body worn cameras . . . .  But they’ve been 
used sporadically—police use cameras when it suits them, and they don’t 
when it doesn’t.  The selective recording that goes on in these police 
misconduct cases has been a real problem for us.  There have been police 
shootings where the cameras simply weren’t turned on.” (quoting Alexandra 
Smith, legal director of the ACLU of New Mexico)). 
84 STANLEY, supra note 82, at 2–3; see also Coudert et al., supra 
note 17, at 756 (“Body-worn cameras have the potential to act as [a] power-
ful deterrent mechanism by exposing behaviour that was previously not 
scrutinised.  Still, the latitude let to police officers to turn the camera on and 
off will be a decisive factor in that regard.”). 
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substantial number of [survey respondents] . . . expressed 
concern that officers would fail to record contentious 
encounters.”85 
The worry that contentious encounters will not be 
recorded unless the cameras are continuously recording is 
supported by empirical evidence.  One study of a body-worn 
camera program in Phoenix required officers to activate their 
cameras in all enforcement encounters.  In reality, however, 
they recorded “only 13.2 to 42.2 percent of incidents.”86  The 
results were almost identical in a Denver pilot project.  In 
that study, the policy required officers to record all uses of 
force but, in fact, less than half of the uses of force were 
caught on camera.87  In a British study where the body-worn 
camera policy required recording of all police attendances for 
domestic violence, only one in six officers recorded every 
incident.88  Finally, in New Orleans, a court-appointed mon-
itor reported that only about one third of uses of force were 
recorded, despite a consent decree requiring the recording of 
all uses of force.89 
Of course, not all failures to record suggest that there 
has been deliberate wrongdoing, but the failure to record 
does have at least the potential to mask such wrongdoing.  
What the aforementioned statistics suggest is that the only 
way to ensure that all potential incidents of deliberate 
wrongdoing—such as deliberate racial profiling—are record-
ed is to require continuous recording.  There are, however, 
some significant obstacles to implementing a continuous 
recording policy, most obviously privacy-oriented objections 
from both police and civilians. 
 
                                               
85 THE POLICING PROJECT, supra note 17, at 11. 
86 KATZ ET AL., supra note 12, at 3. 
87 NICHOLAS E. MITCHELL, DENVER OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR, 
THE DENVER POLICE DEPARTMENT’S BODY WORN CAMERA PILOT PROJECT: A 
FOCUS ON POLICY AND LESSONS LEARNED 1 (2015). 
88 CATHERINE OWENS ET AL., THE ESSEX BODY WORN VIDEO TRIAL: 
THE IMPACT OF BODY WORN VIDEO ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE OUTCOMES OF 
DOMESTIC ABUSE INCIDENTS 2 (2014). 
89 2014 NEW ORLEANS CONSENT DECREE MONITOR THIRD Q. REP. 
23–25; see also Ken Daley, Cameras Not on Most of the Time When NOPD 
Uses Force, Monitor Finds, NOLA.COM (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.nola.com/ 
crime/index.ssf/2014/09/cameras_not_on_most_of_the_tim.html [https://perma 
.cc/T7HG-S96G]. 
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2. Obstacles to Continuous Recording  
Despite the fact that continuous recording would best 
protect against deliberate racial profiling, there is little pro-
spect of such a policy receiving popular support.90  The near 
consensus is that continuous recording policies unjustifiably 
infringe on the privacy of police officers and civilians.  Di-
verse interest groups from across the political spectrum 
converge on this position, including police unions,91 civil 
rights groups,92 and scholars,93 all of which have expressed 
views that the benefits of continuous recording are incapable 
of outweighing the collateral privacy incursions.94  The 
ACLU’s position provides a summary of the range of con-
cerns: “Continuous recording would . . . mean a lot of mass 
surveillance of citizens’ ordinary activities. . . . [and] would 
also impinge on police officers when they are sitting in a 
station house or patrol car shooting the breeze.”95 
 
3. Recording All Police-Civilian 
Interactions 
Given the apparently insurmountable opposition to 
continuous recording, it is necessary to ask: What is the next 
                                               
90 Cf. Josh Feit, Seattle State Senator, ACLU Call for Tougher 
Body Cam Guidelines than in SPD Pilot, SEATTLE MET (Feb. 9, 2015), 
https://www.seattlemet.com/articles/2015/2/9/aclu-body-cam-bill-calls-for-
tougher-oversight-than-spd-version-february-2015 [https://perma.cc/8HVA-
KHWK] (describing an unsuccessful bill introduced in the Washington 
state legislature that sought to impose continuous recording requirements 
on police officers). 
91 See, e.g., NYPD, NYPD RESPONSE TO PUBLIC AND OFFICER INPUT 
ON THE DEPARTMENT’S PROPOSED BODY-WORN CAMERA POLICY 11 (2017) 
(“Non-stop recording is impractical both because it would require a vast 
increase in long-term data storage capacity and because it would represent 
an invasion of the privacy of many people whom the police encounter.”). 
92 See, e.g., STANLEY, supra note 82, at 3 (“Continuous recording 
would also mean a lot of mass surveillance of citizens’ ordinary activities.”). 
93 See, e.g., Coudert et al., supra note 17, at 758 (“Constant 
recording does not seem an acceptable interference into the right to privacy 
of policemen and of the persons filmed.”). 
94 See Fan, supra note 16, at 426 (“Continuous recording is 
controversial to privacy proponents and law enforcement officers because 
of the heavy burden on the privacy of officers and members of the public 
they encounter.”). 
95 STANLEY, supra note 82, at 3. 
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best activation policy to reduce deliberate racial profiling?  
Scholarship has called for body-worn camera policies that 
require recording of all police-civilian interactions.96  Yet, 
none has specifically considered how such a policy might help 
curb deliberate racial profiling.  My claim that such an acti-
vation policy would reduce deliberate racial profiling relies 
on three separate sub-claims.  First, police officers who ad-
here to the policy and record all interactions with civilians 
but nevertheless engage in deliberate racial profiling will 
likely be discovered and disciplined. 
Secondly, a policy requiring the recording of all police-
civilian interactions makes it more difficult for officers to 
remain undetected when they keep their cameras off so as to 
engage in deliberate racial profiling.  Such behavior will raise 
a “red flag”97 for supervisors reviewing or auditing the 
officer’s behavior.98  The more a policy requires cameras to be 
turned on, the more suspicious periods of non-recording will 
be to a supervisor reviewing an officer’s body-worn camera 
log.  As has been explained by others adhering to this theory, 
“[r]isks resulting from on-the-fly editing [to avoid recording 
deliberate misconduct] . . . could be mitigated by tracking 
how often officers switch recording on and off and flagging 
those who do it exceptionally often.”99 
Finally, where activation is required for all police-
civilian interactions, a police officer considering turning their 
camera off in order to engage in deliberate racial profiling 
                                               
96 See, e.g., Harris, supra note 50, at 365 (“In order for recordings 
[to most effectively improve police behavior] . . . the law, departmental 
rules, or both would have to require officers to record every interaction 
with citizens.”); Newell, supra note 80, at 85 (“The deployment of officer-
mounted cameras may only serve to support citizen oversight and law 
enforcement accountability when . . . officers adhere to strict guidelines 
requiring activation during every citizen encounter (unlikely) . . . .”); 
Freund, supra note 17, at 128 (“This Note recommends that officers turn 
on their cameras whenever they exit the vehicle to interact with a member 
of the public, but may subsequently turn off their camera if requested by a 
member of the public.”). 
97 Roy, supra note 73, at 40 (noting that more expansive activation 
policies will mean that when officers fail to activate their cameras, this will 
raise “red flags” for supervisors reviewing the officers). 
98 See Coudert et al., supra note 17, at 756 (“[I]n order for body-
worn cameras to be an efficient tool leading to socially-desirable behaviour 
of the officers who wear them . . . [there must be] a given level of certainty 
of being apprehended in case of misbehaviour . . . .”). 
99 Id. at 759. 
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may be deterred by the likelihood that another police of-
ficer—such as a partner or team member—will be recording.  
Ariel and his colleagues have labeled this secondary deter-
rence mechanism “contagious accountability,”100 and two of 
the ACLU’s body-worn camera experts have endorsed the 
idea.101 
In light of these three arguments, this Note suggests 
that an activation policy requiring recording of all police-
civilian interactions will reduce instances of racial profiling.  
Remembering that deliberate racial profiling functions on a 
conscious rather than an unconscious level (contrary to im-
plicit bias), the following section turns to best practices for 
curtailing the unconscious bias problem. 
 
B. Activation Requirements and Implicit Racial 
Bias 
How exactly do we think body-worn cameras can 
reduce implicit racial bias?  Most researchers seem to accept 
that the deterrence benefits of body-worn cameras do not ex-
tend to non-deliberative behavior, including behavior based 
on implicit racial bias.102  This rather pessimistic conclusion 
stands to reason that because implicit racial bias operates at 
a subconscious level, it is hard to believe that it would be af-
fected by deliberative assessments of the possibility of one’s 
actions being observed.103  One empirical study confirms this 
intuition.  Researchers at Stanford University used body-
                                               
100 See Ariel et al., supra note 79 (hypothesizing that body-worn 
cameras may in fact influence officer behavior even when they are not 
recording, because officers will become so accustomed to the oversight of 
body-worn cameras that they will assume constant surveillance, either 
from their own device or from that of another officer). 
101 See Chad Marlow & Jay Stanley, Should We Reassess Police 
Body Cameras Based on Latest Study?, ACLU: FREE FUTURE (Nov. 20, 
2017, 4:15 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/surveillance-
technologies/should-we-reassess-police-body-cameras-based [https://perma.cc 
/8TPU-EXNS]. 
102 See, e.g., Ariel et al., supra note 12, at 518 (limiting their causal 
hypothesis to deliberative or thoughtful behavior); Lawrence Rosenthal, 
Good and Bad Ways to Address Police Violence, 48 URB. LAW. 675, 684 
(2016) (doubting that implicit bias can be “solved” by body-worn cameras). 
103 See Spencer et al., supra note 23, at 58 (“[E]ven the specter of 
one’s behavior being reviewed may not help officers avoid the impact of 
implicit biases on their behaviors, any more than they can prevent bias from 
affecting them on the shooter task.”). 
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worn camera footage from routine police traffic stops in 
Oakland to assess the respectfulness of officers interacting 
with civilians of different races.  The study found that “of-
ficers speak with consistently less respect toward [B]lack 
versus [W]hite community members.”104  This was the case 
notwithstanding the fact that the police officers knew that 
they were being recorded.  Similarly, a number of studies of 
doctor-patient interactions have shown that doctors consist-
ently offer a lower level of care to patients who do not share 
the doctor’s race or ethnicity, despite the fact that the doctors 
know that they are being recorded on audio and/or audio-
visual equipment.105  Although the authors of these studies do 
not purport to identify a cause for this observed effect, it is at 
least plausible that the police officers and doctors treated ci-
vilians and patients differently based on implicit racial 
biases rather than any deliberate racial profiling.  The plau-
sibility of this conclusion rests on the assumption, supported 
above,106 that implicit racial bias is more widespread than 
deliberate racial profiling and thus that the police officers and 
doctors are more likely to be discriminating subconsciously. 
If we accept that body-worn cameras are inapt in 
deterring implicit racial biases, we need to rely on the 
accountability and training theories for any hope of change.  
Under these theories, we can hypothesize that body-worn 
cameras will allow police departments to more readily identi-
fy officers acting on implicit racial biases.  Such officers could 
then be disciplined and/or subjected to remedial training.107  
For instance, a supervisor reviewing body-worn camera 
footage of pedestrian stops might observe that a particular 
                                               
104 Rob Voigt et al., Language from Police Body Camera Footage 
Shows Racial Disparities in Officer Respect, 114 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 
U.S. 6521, 6521 (2017). 
105 See, e.g., Lisa A. Cooper et al., Patient-Centered Communication, 
Ratings of Care, and Concordance of Patient and Physician Race, 139 
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 907 (2003); Joke C.M. van Wieringen et al., 
Intercultural Communication in General Practice, 12 EUR. J. PUB. HEALTH 63 
(2002). 
106 See sources cited supra note 27. 
107 On implicit bias training, see Richardson, supra note 32, at 
2054–55 (“Even asking people to be nonprejudiced can reduce implicit biases.  
Consequently, courts and police departments may be able to implement 
strategies for reducing their effects on behavior.” (footnote omitted)).  But see 
Spencer et al., supra note 23, at 58 (“[T]here is little empirical evidence to 
support the effectiveness of such trainings, and they are rarely systematically 
evaluated.”). 
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officer appears to be disproportionately stopping Black civil-
ians absent any objective grounds.  The supervisor could then 
bring this to the attention of the officer and, absent an 
explanation,108 discipline the officer and/or require them to 
participate in de-biasing training.  Similarly, if supervisors 
reviewing body-worn camera footage detect a department-
wide trend suggesting widely shared implicit racial biases, 
they could implement mandatory de-biasing training for the 
entire department.109 
Encouragingly, body-worn camera footage is already 
being reviewed by police departments for exactly these pur-
poses.  In San Diego, one of the key motivations for the body-
worn camera program was to inform a better understanding 
of the way racial biases operate within the police force and 
how it might best be addressed.  The San Diego chief of police 
explained: 
 
When it comes to collecting data, the raw 
numbers don’t always fully capture the true 
scope of a problem . . . .  But by capturing an 
audio and video account of an encounter, cam-
eras provide an objective record of whether ra-
cial profiling took place, what patterns of 
                                               
108 Of course, body-worn camera footage will rarely provide all the 
necessary information about a given police-civilian interaction.  On the limits 
of body-worn camera footage, see Natalie Todak, De-Escalation in Police-
Citizen Encounters: A Mixed Methods Study of a Misunderstood Policing 
Strategy 172–73 (Aug. 2017) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Arizona State 
University), https://repository.asu.edu/attachments/189627/content/Todak_ 
asu_0010E_17217.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QQW-4F32] (“[B]ody worn camera 
footage comes with its own set of limitations. . . .  Numerous details 
pertaining to the social interaction, background including the officer’s 
previous knowledge of the citizen or the type of call, the officer’s fatigue 
levels and previous work shifts and stressors, as well as the aftermath of 
the interaction are substantially clouded in a body camera video.”); and see 
also Gráinne Perkins, Commentary, Lights, Camera, Action! Body-Worn 
Cameras: Challenges and Opportunities in Police Research, 12 POLICING 
120, 122 (2018) (“BWCs are only one method of understanding police ac-
tions.  How the police operate can be better understood in the examination 
of why they act in a certain manner.”). 
109 The Department of Justice recently implemented mandatory 
implicit bias training for more than 33,000 federal agents and prosecutors.  
See Julia Edwards, Justice Dept. Mandates “Implicit Bias” Training for 
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officer behavior are present, and how often the 
problem occurs.110 
 
The Oakland study mentioned earlier appears to have been 
driven by similar ideas.  The Stanford researchers who con-
ducted the study hoped that the identification of the racial 
biases displayed in the body-worn camera footage would offer 
an opportunity for advancing police training.111 
In light of the above, the activation policy that rec-
ommends itself to best reduce implicit racial bias is again a 
policy requiring presumptive recording of all police-civilian 
interactions.  Such a policy would capture as much police 
conduct as possible so as to maximize the opportunity of re-
viewing officers to detect, discipline, and retrain officers who 
appear to be acting on implicit racial biases.  A draft proposal 
for such a policy is provided in Section VI.D, but one 
important matter—“consensual” interactions—should be dis-
cussed so that it may then be assimilated into the draft 
proposal. 
 
C. Activation Requirements and “Consensual” 
Interactions  
The final relation between body-worn camera policies 
and racial bias that warrants discussion is the recording re-
quirements for “consensual” interactions between police and 
civilians.112  Fan describes “consensual” interactions as of-
ficer-initiated contact with a civilian “typically in situations 
where there is either no articulable basis yet for reasonable 
suspicion or it is unclear if there is a sufficient basis.”113 
 
                                               
110 MILLER ET AL., supra note 17, at 8.  Although the speaker uses 
the term “racial profiling,” it is apparent that he is not referring to deliberate 
racial profiling but instead to “patterns” of implicit racial bias. 
111 Voigt et al., supra note 104, at 6521. 
112 See Fan, supra note 6, at 933–34. 
113 Id. at 933; cf. Devallis Rutledge, Consensual Encounters, POLICE 
MAG. (Feb. 5, 2016) http://www.policemag.com/channel/patrol/articles/2016/ 
02/consensual-encounters.aspx [https://perma.cc/T8EX-6MSX] (“Consensual 
encounters, in which police use no commands, force, red or blue lights or 
sirens, but simply approach a person and engage him in conversation and 
make plain-view observations without any official restraints, and for which 
no level of justification is needed, because unlike arrests and detentions, the 
consensual encounter is not a Fourth Amendment ‘seizure’ of the person.”). 
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1. Racial Bias in “Consensual” 
Interactions 
Because “consensual” interactions do not attract Fourth 
Amendment scrutiny,114 police officers do not need probable 
cause or even a reasonable suspicion; they can act on a 
hunch or no hunch at all.115  It should be unsurprising, then, 
that “consensual” interactions are common sites for de-
liberate racial profiling and implicit racial bias.116   People of 
color are the subjects of “consensual” police interactions at a 
disproportionate rate.117  This is especially true with respect 
                                               
114 See Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1984) (“The initial 
contact between officers and [civilian], where they simply asked if he 
would step aside and talk with them, was clearly the sort of consensual 
encounter that implicates no Fourth Amendment interest.”); Florida v. 
Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434–36 (1991) (“Our cases make it clear that a sei-
zure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual 
and asks a few questions. . . .  The encounter will not trigger Fourth 
Amendment scrutiny unless it loses its consensual nature.”). 
115 See Margaret Raymond, The Right to Refuse and the 
Obligation to Comply: Challenging the Gamesmanship Model of Criminal 
Procedure, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1483, 1486 (2007) (“Police are free to initiate a 
consensual encounter with an individual for any reason or no reason, 
perhaps based on a whim or a ‘hunch’ that cannot be supported by specific 
and articulable facts.”); Daniel J. Steinbock, The Wrong Line Between 
Freedom and Restraint: The Unreality, Obscurity, and Incivility of the 
Fourth Amendment Consensual Encounter Doctrine, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
507, 509 (2001) (“[A] consensual encounter can be initiated for no reason or 
for any reason at all . . . .”). 
116 See I. Bennett Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: 
Race, Citizenship, and the Equality Principle, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 
40 (2011) (“[A]n officer’s decision to single out an individual for a limited 
detention or consensual encounter is more likely to be based on implicit 
racial biases unknown to the officer rather than deliberate racism.”); 
Burke, supra note 78, at 547 (“When there is no other justification for the 
search, the odds are higher that police are requesting consent, either 
consciously or unconsciously, based on racial or other stereotypes.”); 
Wesley MacNeil Oliver, With an Evil Eye and an Unequal Hand: Pretextual 
Stops and Doctrinal Remedies to Racial Profiling, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1409, 
1410–11 (2000) (describing “consensual” vehicular searches as “[t]he 
archetypal example of racial profiling”). 
117 See Racial Disparity in Consent Searches and Dog Sniff Searches, 
ACLU ILL. (Aug. 13, 2014), https://www.aclu-il.org/en/publications/racial-
disparity-consent-searches-and-dog-sniff-searches [https://perma.cc/PA5X 
-P8DD] (describing racial disparities in people subjected to “consensual” 
vehicular searches); see also Steinbock, supra note 115, at 537 (“[C]onsensual 
encounters are more likely to be used against minorities and the poor . . . .”). 
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to “consensual” searches, whereby police will search a person 
after obtaining their verbal “consent.”118  
 
2. Activation Policies and “Consensual” 
Interactions 
Of the police departments that I studied, all required 
the recording of “consensual” searches.  Most also required 
recording of the request for consent to search.  The New York 
and Philadelphia police departments, however, did not ex-
plicitly require the request and consent to be recorded—just 
the search itself.  Unfortunately, Fan does not appear to 
have considered “consensual” searches as a discrete category 
of “consensual” interaction.  Thus, we are unable to assess 
whether my finding of a widespread requirement for the re-
cording of “consensual” searches is a novel development.  
The position with respect to “consensual” stops is less 
satisfactory.  Of the police departments that Fan studied, 
only a quarter required officers to activate their cameras for 
“consensual” stops.119  These numbers were largely consistent 
with my study, where, as shown in Appendix C, four of the 
ten department policies required recording “consensual” 
stops.  This is concerning.  In light of the acute danger of 
racial bias in “consensual” interactions, it is imperative that 
such interactions be covered by a mandatory activation 
requirement. 
As this Note has explained in the preceding sections, 
the greater the mandatory recording coverage of a body-worn 
camera policy, the more effective such a policy will be at 
reducing deliberate racial profiling and implicit racial bias.  
Take the example of a police officer who is patrolling a par-
ticular neighborhood and disproportionately, and without 
reasonable suspicion, approaches and questions young Black 
males.  The officer would appear to be deliberately racially 
profiling or acting on implicit racial bias.  If the officer is de-
liberately racially profiling, then mandatory recording may 
result in disciplinary action.  On the other hand, if the officer 
is motivated by implicit racial bias, then mandatory record-
ing of his behavior will likely result in it being detected by a 
superior who could then engage him in remedial training.  
                                               
118 GLASER, supra note 26, at 36. 
119 Fan, supra note 6, at 932. 
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Either way, the camera needs to be recording in order to en-
gage the relevant theory of change.  It is for this reason that 
the policy proposed in the next section requires recording of 
all “consensual” interactions, both stops and searches. 
 
D. Proposal for a Minimal Discretion Activation 
Policy 
The differences, highlighted above, between Fan’s 
December 2015 study of activation policies and my December 
2017 study of policies suggest that, at least among the larger 
police departments, there is a trend from limited to minimal 
activation policies.  The preceding discussion argued that this 
trend furthers the capacity of body-worn cameras to combat 
racially biased policing.120  Importantly, however, this Note 
has suggested that we ought to consider an even more 
ambitious activation policy—one that requires recording of 
all police-civilian interactions—if we want body-worn cameras 
to more effectively limit both deliberate racial profiling and 





1. For the purposes of this rule, the following 
definitions apply: 
a. Activation: the turning on of the re-
cording function on a body-worn 
camera.122 
                                               
120 Cf. Roy, supra note 73, at 14 (“[Potential downsides of a mini-
mal discretion policy include] a more rigid or inflexible form of manage-
ment control could convey to line officers a message of distrust or stifle 
their ability to make sound decisions under pressure.”). 
121 For other aspirational draft policies, see Kampfe, supra note 
17, at 1196 (“Participants should manually activate both the audio and 
visual features of their BWC prior to ‘responding to a call for service or at 
the initiation of any other law enforcement or investigative encounter 
between a police officer and a member of the public,’ unless doing so would 
be ‘unsafe, impossible, or impractical.’ ” (footnote omitted)); and ACLU, A 
MODEL ACT FOR REGULATING THE USE OF WEARABLE BODY CAMERAS BY LAW 
ENFORCEMENT § 1(b) (2017), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_ 
document/aclu_police_body_cameras_model_legislation_jan_2017.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/32CC-SVDS]. 
122 Cf. PHILA. POLICE DEP’T, DIRECTIVE 4.21, BODY-WORN CAMERAS 
§ 5(A) (2016) (“Activate—Any process or action that causes a Body-Worn 
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b. Deactivation: the turning off of the 
recording function on a body-worn 
camera. 
c. Confidential police informant: a 
person who an officer reasonably be-
lieves to be seeking to anonymously 
report a crime or anonymously as-
sist in an ongoing law enforcement 
investigation.123 
 
Mandatory Activation of Body-Worn Cameras 
 
2. While on duty, a member must activate 
their body-worn camera immediately prior 
to all interactions with civilians.124 
3. If, for whatever reason, a member is unable 
to activate their body-worn camera prior to 
the commencement of a civilian interaction, 
the officer must activate the device as soon 
as possible thereafter.125 
4. The civilian interactions described in Rules 
2 and 3 include, but are not limited to: 
a. Welfare checks; 
b. Community caretaking functions; 
c. Calls for service; 
d. Consensual interactions; 
e. Consent searches (including search-
es of people, items, vehicles, build-
ings, and places); 
f. Requests for consent to search; 
g. Nonconsensual searches (including 
searches of people, items, vehicles, 
buildings, and places); 
h. Investigatory or enforcement stops 
(including stops of pedestrians and 
vehicles); 
                                               
Camera to begin recording and storing both audio transmissions and visual 
images.”). 
123 This provision is based on ACLU, supra note 121, § 1(d)(3). 
124 Cf. PHILA. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 122, at § 4(A) (“Authorized 
Body-Worn Cameras will be activated prior to responding to all calls for 
service and during all law enforcement related encounters and activities 
involving the general public.”). 
125 Cf. NYPD, supra note 71, § 7 (“Activate the BWC as soon as it 
is feasible and safe to do so after taking necessary police action to preserve 
human health and safety.”). 
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i. Pursuits (including pursuits of 
pedestrians and vehicles); 
j. Interviews with, or statements by, 
victims, witnesses, or suspects; 
k. Summonses; 
l. Arrests; 
m. Arrestee transport; and 
n. Uses of force. 
 
Notification of Recording 
 
5. As soon as reasonably practicable after 
activating their body-worn cameras, a mem-
ber must notify civilians that the interaction 
is being recorded.126 
 
Exceptions to Mandatory Activation Requirements127 
 
6. The mandatory activation requirements 
described above in Rules 2, 3, and 4 do not 
apply in the circumstances described be-
low.  In these circumstances, and only these 
circumstances, a member must refrain from 
activating their body-worn camera: 
a. Where the member reasonably be-
lieves that recording would com-
promise officer or civilian safety; 
b. Where, in an interaction with a con-
fidential police informant, the in-
formant objects to the recording;128 
c. Where the member is present at a 
“strip search” of a civilian;129 
d. Where, in an interaction with an 
apparent victim of an offense, the 
victim objects to the recording;130 
                                               
126 This provision is based on id. § 4. 
127 This Note has not focused on specific exceptions to mandatory 
recording requirements.  Nevertheless, it offers a sampling of commonly 
endorsed exceptions for illustrative purposes.  Such exceptions should ul-
timately be formulated with input from affected community members.  
128 Cf. NYPD, supra note 71, § 10(e) (prohibiting recording when 
“[i]nterviewing a current or potential confidential informant”). 
129 This provision is based on CHI. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 75, 
§ IV(A)(4), and PHILA. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 122, § 4(C)(1)(d). 
130 Cf. NYPD, supra note 71, § 10(g) (categorically prohibiting record-
ing of interviews with victims of sexual offenses). 
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e. Where a member is in a nonpublic 
area (including a civilian’s home) 
and the member does not have a 
reason to lawfully search that area 
without a warrant;131 
f. Where the member reasonably be-
lieves that recording the interaction 
may compromise patient confidenti-
ality;132 
g. Where the interaction takes place in 
a religious institution and the mem-
ber does not have permission to rec-
ord from the management of that 
institution;133 or 
h. Where the interaction takes place on 
the grounds of any public, private, or 





7. Having activated their body-worn camera, a 
member must deactivate their camera in the 
following circumstances, and the following 
circumstances only: 
a. Where the member comes to rea-
sonably believe that the circum-
stances do not fall, or no longer fall, 
within the mandatory activation re-
quirements of Rules 2, 3, and 4; 
b. Where the member comes to rea-
sonably believe that the interaction 
falls within the circumstances de-
scribed in Rules 6(a)–(h); or 
c. Where the civilian interaction has 
concluded. 
                                               
131 This provision is based on CHI. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 75, 
§ IV(A)(1). 
132 Cf. NYPD, supra note 71, § 10(j) (prohibiting recording “inside 
of a medical facility unless engaging in a police action”). 
133 This provision is based on PHILA. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 122, 
§ 4(B)(4). 
134 This provision is based on ACLU, supra note 121, § 1(h). 
135 Cf. Kampfe, supra note 17, at 1196–97 (affording police discretion 
in the decision to deactivate their cameras). 
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8. Immediately prior to deactivating their 
camera, a member must, if practicable, an-
nounce the reason that they are deactivating 
their camera.136 
9. Having deactivated their camera, a mem-
ber must again activate their camera if cir-
cumstances change such that the reason for 
deactivation is no longer operative and the 
situation falls within the mandatory acti-
vation requirements of Rules 2, 3, and 4. 
 
Notification to Superiors 
 
10. A member will report any and all unre-
corded civilian interactions, and partially 
recorded civilian interactions, to their su-
pervisor.  This report must include the reason 
that the interaction was not recorded or 
partially recorded.137 
 
The above policy is not intended to be a one-size-fits-all 
solution.  Rather, this proposal provides police departments 
and advocacy bodies with a concrete and realizable model of 
how to best minimize racially biased police practices through 
the use of body-worn cameras.  Importantly, this proposal is 
only a starting point for what is necessarily a local, context-
specific discussion.  Any efforts to adopt this model ought to be 
preceded by meaningful community consultation, especially 
with regard to the countervailing privacy interests. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In order to use body-worn cameras most effectively to 
curb racially biased policing, police departments ought to 
require recording of all police-civilian interactions, including 
“consensual” interactions.  Previous research has reaffirmed 
the positive impact of body-worn cameras on police behavior 
when officers are required to record all police-civilian 
                                               
136 This provision is based on CHI. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 75, 
§ III(B)(4). 
137 This provision is based on NYPD, supra note 71, § 6, and CHI. 
POLICE DEP’T, supra note 75, § III(B)(4). 
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interactions.138  Such a policy would also better align with a 
growing public preference for policies requiring recording of 
“all interactions with the public,”139 and the original aims of 
civil rights groups who, in the wake of Ferguson, pushed for 
mandatory recording of “every police-civilian encounter.”140  
Furthermore, such a policy would duly pay heed to the fact 
that Black and Latinx people are more likely than White 
people, and much more likely than police officers, to favor 
such a policy.141 
It is appropriate to sound two cautionary notes.  
Police policies ought to be shaped by the communities who 
will be subjected to them.  This is especially true in the case 
of body-worn cameras, given the extraordinary power they 
have to erode civilian privacy.142  As Barry Friedman and 
Maria Ponomarenko have written: 
 
In a nation that . . . speaks endlessly of 
democratic engagement and the popular will, 
policing is a distinct outlier.  Of all the agen-
cies of executive government, those that “police” 
. . . are the most threatening to the liberties of 
the American people.  Yet, from the standpoint 
                                               
138 See Ariel et al., supra note 12; see also Ariel et al., supra note 
45, at 461 (“[Body-worn cameras can deter police from using force] but only 
in situations where police relinquish some discretion on activating these 
devices.”). 
139 THE POLICING PROJECT, supra note 17, at 12 (“Some 64% of 
respondents [from the public] favored officers recording all interactions with 
the public . . . .”).   
140 See, e.g., Press Release, Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights 
Under Law et al., supra note 44. 
141 Compare THE POLICING PROJECT, supra note 17, at 8 (recording 
survey results suggesting that Blacks and Latinxs are more likely than 
Whites to support a policy requiring officers to record all interactions with 
the public), with NYPD, supra note 91, app. A (question 6) (reporting that 
only twenty-six percent of surveyed officers believed that they should be 
required to record all interactions with members of the public). 
142 See Christopher Slobogin, Community Control over Camera 
Surveillance: A Response to Bennett Capers’s Crime, Surveillance, and 
Communities, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 993, 996–98 (2013) (arguing for the 
importance of community authorization of camera surveillance systems); see, 
e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 10.109.020 (2018) (“Any ordinance or resolution 
authorizing the use of body worn cameras should identify a community 
involvement process for providing input into the development of operational 
policies governing the use of body worn cameras.”). 
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of democratic governance, they are the least 
regulated.143 
 
The body-worn camera policy space, where community con-
sultation is already happening and should continue, is slowly 
correcting this democratic deficit.144  The model that this 
Note has suggested is thus not prescriptive, but submitted as 
a useful starting point for discussions between police de-
partments and affected communities across the country as 
the body-worn camera revolution continues.   
Though body-worn cameras may go some way to curb-
ing racial bias in policing, they are almost certainly not the 
panacea that some people initially hoped they would be.145  
In order to best reduce racial bias in policing, what is needed 
is change in recruiting, organizational culture, training, and 
accountability mechanisms.146  This will take time.  In the 




                                               
143 Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 
90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827, 1830–31 (2015) (footnote omitted). 
144 See Fan, supra note 16, at 402 n.26 (providing examples of 
different methods of community consultation on body-worn camera policies). 
145 Cf. Ariel et al., supra note 79, at 294 (“[E]nthusiasm for a 
technological ‘fix’ to the perceived crisis in police legitimacy is unsurprising, 
as it is far cheaper to implement technology than [to] retrain officers or 
solve more endemic social problems.”); Developments in the Law¾Policing, 
supra note 58, at 1797 (“Their adoption should also not be used as an 
excuse to stifle continued conversation about the root causes of police violence 
and fractured community relations, as body cameras alone will never be the 
hoped-for cure-all.”). 
146 Cf. Katheryn Russell-Brown, Body Cameras, Police Violence, 
and Racial Credibility, 67 FLA. L. REV. F. 207, 213 (2016) (“Requiring police 
to wear body cameras may do some good.  However, we must address why 
Black claims of state violence have historically been dismissed as incredible, 
non-critical, and rare.  We cannot look to cameras (or other technologies), 
to solve a problem that has historical roots in racial discrimination.”). 
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VIII. APPENDIX A: STATED OBJECTIVES OF POLICE 
DEPARTMENT BODY-WORN CAMERA POLICIES 
 
 
Accountability Transparency Training 
New York 
Police (NY) 
X - - 
Chicago 
Police (IL) 
- X X 
Los Angeles 
Police (CA) 
X - X 
Philadelphia 
Police (PA) 
- - X 
Houston 
Police (TX) 




- - X 
Dallas Police 
(TX) 
- X X 
Phoenix 
Police (AZ) 
X - X 
Baltimore 
Police (MD) 
X X X 
Miami-Dade 
Police (FL) 
X X X 
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IX. APPENDIX B: DEGREE OF DISCRETION AFFORDED TO 
OFFICERS IN ACTIVATION POLICIES 
 Limited Discretion Minimal 
Discretion 
New York Police 
(NY) 
X - 
Chicago Police (IL) - X 























TOTAL  2 8 
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X. APPENDIX C: ACTIVATION POLICIES REQUIRING 










- X - 
Chicago 
Police (IL) 
- X X 
Los Angeles 
Police (CA) 
X X X 
Philadelphia 
Police (PA) 
- X - 
Houston 
Police (TX) 




X X X 
Dallas Police 
(TX) 
- X X 
Phoenix 
Police (AZ) 
- X X 
Baltimore 
Police (MD) 
- X X 
Miami-Dade 
Police (FL) 
X X X 
TOTAL  4 10 8 
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XI. APPENDIX D: METHODOLOGY 
A. Choice of Sample  
My sample is made up of the ten largest metropolitan 
police departments in the United States (as measured by the 
number of full-time sworn personnel).  I chose to study 
metropolitan police departments, rather than specialized 
agencies also using body-worn cameras, in order to capture 
the widest variety of police activities and the highest number 
of police-civilian interactions.147  Similarly, I focused on the 
largest police departments because these are likely to serve 
the largest number of civilians and arguably are more likely 
than smaller departments to have expended considerable 
time and energy in formulating body-worn camera policies. 
To determine which departments fell within my pa-
rameters, I relied upon data from the most recent Law 
Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics 
(LEMAS) Survey.148  This survey is sponsored by the Bureau 
of Justice Statistics, a subsidiary body within the Depart-
ment of Justice.149  The most recent survey data is from 2013 
and was reported in May 2015.150  The police departments in 
my study were, from largest to smallest: New York (NY), 
Chicago (IL), Los Angeles (CA), Philadelphia (PA), Houston 
(TX), Washington (DC), Dallas (TX), Phoenix (AZ), Baltimore 
(MD), and Miami-Dade (FL).151 
                                               
147 Cf. Fan, supra note 16, at 424 (“The data collection focused on 
the primary police department serving each city because the portfolio of 
law enforcement activities by the municipal police department is broader 
than specialized agencies.  Moreover, the primary municipal police agency 
typically serves the greater portion of the city area and more people.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
148 BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2013: PERSONNEL, POLICIES, AND 
PRACTICES (Irene Cooperman et al. eds., 2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/ 
pub/pdf/lpd13ppp.pdf [https://perma.cc/KN94-X95U]. 
149 See id. at 1 (“The LEMAS Survey, conducted periodically since 
1987, collects data on a range of topics from a nationally representative 
sample of state and local law enforcement agencies.”). 
150 See id. 
151 Id. at 14 app., tbl.2. 
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My relatively small sample number (n=10) was in-
formed by my study’s time and resource constraints and 
constitutes an admittedly significant study limitation.  Nev-
ertheless, my sample size includes geographically diverse 
cities and populations of dramatically different sizes (from 
New York’s population of approximately 8,500,000152 to 
Miami’s population of approximately 500,000153).  Fur-
thermore, the policies of these ten departments are worthy of 
close study because the policy choices made by these large 
departments are most likely to be imitated by other, smaller 
departments.154 
 
B. Obtaining the Policies 
All of the police departments included in my study 
had publicly available policies on their officers’ use of body-
worn cameras.  Two invaluable resources in locating the poli-
cies were the websites of the Brennan Center155 and the 
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press.156  Other use-
ful web-based policy and legislation aggregators were the 
Urban Institute157 and Arizona State University.158  I 
supplemented the few gaps in coverage from these websites 
                                               
152 New York, New York, CITY-DATA.COM, http://www.city-data 
.com/city/New-York-New-York.html [https://perma.cc/CEP5-3ULP]. 
153 Miami, Florida, CITY-DATA.COM, http://www.city-data.com/ 
city/Miami-Florida.html [https://perma.cc/L3D5-UCSC]. 
154 See Fan, supra note 16, at 424 (“[P]rominent cities help set the 
standards for others to emulate.”); Charles R. Shipan & Craig Volden, The 
Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 840, 843 (2008) (“The 
likelihood of a city adopting a policy increases when its nearest bigger neighbor 
adopts the same policy.”). 
155 Police Body-Worn Camera Policies, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., 
https://www.brennancenter.org/body-cam-city-map [https://perma.cc/DY4X-
7MFG] (last updated Sept. 26, 2016). 
156 Access to Police Body-Worn Camera Video, REPORTERS COMMITTEE 
FOR FREEDOM PRESS, https://www.rcfp.org/bodycams [https://perma.cc/NK4 
G-GADB]. 
157 Police Body-Worn Cameras: Where Your State Stands, URB. INST., 
http://urbn.is/bodycam [https://perma.cc/L86T-PTYW]. 
158 10 Body-Worn Camera Programs: How Do They Compare?, 
ARIZ. ST. U. SCH. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST., https://ccj.asu.edu/content/10-
body-worn-camera-programs-how-do-they-compare [https://perma.cc/2DCT-
7QMT]. 
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with independent web-based research, including reference to 
individual department websites.159  The policies are as in 
force on December 31, 2017. 
 
C. Specific Methodology: Appendix A 
My methodology for the results generated in 
Appendix A was to search the department policies for the 
words “accountability,” “transparency,” and “training.”  In the 
case of “accountability” and “transparency,” I searched only 
the portion of the policy devoted to objectives or goals.  In the 
case of “training,” I searched both the objectives and goals 
portions of the policy and also searched for any mention of 
the word “training” as a consequence of noncompliance with 
department policy. 
 
D. Specific Methodology: Appendix B 
My methodology for the results generated in 
Appendix B was to measure the department activation poli-
cies against my binary definitions of the “limited discretion” 
model160 and the “minimal discretion” model.161  Put simply, I 
categorized a policy as a limited discretion model if it only 
imposed a mandatory recording requirement with respect to 
specifically enumerated events.  Contrapuntally, I categorized 
a policy as a minimal discretion model if it imposed a 
mandatory recording obligation stated in general terms (for 
example, “[o]fficers shall . . . record all law enforcement 
activities”162). 
 
                                               
159 Cf. Fan, supra note 6, at 930 n.183 (adopting similar methods 
for obtaining department policies). 
160 See supra Section V(A) (“Limited discretion activation policies 
operate by presumptively providing police officers discretion as to whether 
or not to record their activities while on duty.  This presumption of officer 
discretion is only displaced in specific circumstances (in which recording is 
mandatory).” (footnote omitted)).  
161 See supra Section V(B) (“[Minimal discretion activation] policies 
start from a presumption that all enforcement activities will be recorded, 
subject only to narrow exceptions.”).  
162 HOUS. POLICE DEP’T, GENERAL ORDER NO. 400-28, BODY WORN 
CAMERAS § 6, at 3 (2017). 
No. 4:141]          IS IT RECORDING? 189 
 
E. Specific Methodology: Appendix C 
The results presented in Appendix C represent per-
haps the most contestable of my findings because they are 
based in part on my definition of “consensual” interactions.  
In order that interested readers can test my results against 
their own definitions of “consensual” interactions, I include 
in the footnotes below the specific provisions of the various 
policies that I adjudged to support my findings.  The policies 
I understood to require mandatory recording of “consensual” 
interactions were: Los Angeles,163 Houston,164 Washington, 
D.C.,165 and Miami.166  I adjudged all ten policies to cover 
“consensual” searches.167  Finally, I characterized eight of the 
policies (all except the New York and Philadelphia policies) 
to require mandatory recording of requests for consent to 
search.168 
 
                                               
163 See L.A. POLICE DEP’T, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF POLICE, SPECIAL 
ORDER NO. 12, BODY-WORN VIDEO PROCEDURES—ESTABLISHED § III (2015) 
(requiring recording of all “[p]edestrian stops (including officer-initiated 
consensual encounters)”). 
164 See HOUS. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 162, at 1, 3 (requiring 
recording of “[a]ny event during which an officer exercises his police authority 
or conducts any type of investigation, whether consensual or otherwise”). 
165 See METRO. POLICE DEP’T OF THE D.C., GO-SPT-302.13, BODY-
WORN CAMERA PROGRAM § V(A)(3) (2016) (requiring recording of all “self-
initiated police action”). 
166 See MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEP’T, DIRECTIVE 16-18, BODY-WORN 
CAMERA SYSTEM §§ V(H), VII(B) (2016) (requiring recording of all instances 
“where a law enforcement officer, acting in an official capacity, comes in 
contact with the general public”). 
167 See NYPD, supra note 71, § 5(e); CHI. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 
75, § III(A)(2)(j); L.A. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 163; PHILA. POLICE DEP’T, 
supra note 122, § 4(A); HOUS. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 162, at 1; METRO. 
POLICE DEP’T OF THE D.C., supra note 165, § V(A)(4)(p)(1); DALL. POLICE 
DEP’T, GENERAL ORDER 332.00, BODY WORN CAMERAS § 332.04(A)(1)(g) 
(2015); PHX. POLICE DEP’T, OPERATIONS ORDER 4.49, BODY-WORN VIDEO 
TECHNOLOGY § 3(B)(3)(a) (2018); BALT. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 77; MIAMI-
DADE POLICE DEP’T, supra note 166, § VII(B)(7) (requiring recording of all 
searches, presumably including “consensual” searches).  
168 See CHI. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 75, § III(2)(l); L.A. POLICE 
DEP’T, supra note 163; HOUS. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 162, at 1, 3; METRO. 
POLICE DEP’T OF THE D.C., supra note 165; DALL. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 
167; PHX. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 167; BALT. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 77; 
MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEP’T, supra note 166. 
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